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The New International Competitive Environment for Trade in
Goods and Services
Gary Hufbauer*
M y starting assumption is that the principle engines for innovation
are wide-open competitive markets. Protection of intellectual prop-
erty is certainly an important ancillary policy, but in my view, competi-
tion is the central innovation policy. Basically this view derives from
looking at what economists call the total factor productivity growth.
Generally speaking, those countries which have embraced competitive
policies have done much better, over a period of decades, in increasing
output per unit of capital and per unit of labor than economies which
have not had the benefit of the spur of competition.
The main international instrument for spurring competition is, of
course, open trade policy. The recently concluded Uruguay Round and
the NAFTA are hallmark examples of open trade policy. In looking at
the horizon, we have the Free Trade Agreement in the Americas
(FTAA) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) process.
The setback in Mexico has slowed the FTAA initiative. But over the
next decade the initiative will make enormous strides.
Let me briefly address the follow-on agenda of the World Trade
Organization (WTO). Two items are high on the future agenda: envi-
ronment and competition policy. It is pretty certain that there will be a
big environmental component in future trade talks, but, how this com-
ponent will be handled remains to be seen. However, competition pol-
icy, which was so much talked about two years ago, seems unlikely to
emerge in the form of an explicit code or set of principles. The reasons
for my skepticism are explained very fully by Rosenthal & Nicoladies
in a yet-to-be-published chapter in a forthcoming 1lE book.
Let me tell you why I do not think we will see an explicit competi-
tion policy code coming out of the WTO or for that matter the
NAFTA. Even though a central purpose of active trade liberalization
policy in the WTO and the NAFTA has been to enhance competition,
the basic problem is that other values are closer to the hearts and
minds of most domestic constituencies. Five conflicting values deserve
mention. First, protectionist trade measures on an industry-specific or a
product-specific basis are very popular. The main example is the anti-
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dumping law. This law has a very strong political constituency in the
United States, in Canada, and in Europe.
Secondly, measures either to attract or repel foreign investors are
widely used. In some industries, countries love foreign investors and
sweep aside all concepts of competition in trying to attract them. In
other industries, countries dislike foreign investors, and they disregard
concepts of competition in trying to keep those investors out. You can
fill in the blanks.
Thirdly, behind-the-border measures may be designed to enhance
domestic products or firms in an anti-competitive, fashion. Sematech in
the United States, for example, was designed to exclude foreign compa-
nies. The all-electric car initiative deliberately excludes Toyota. The
market for replacement auto parts in Japan is rigged against foreign
suppliers. You could go on and on in enumerating pro-domestic product
measures.
Fourth, industrial policies are often used to promote champion
firms in an anti-competitive fashion.
Fifth and finally, intellectual property protection is designed to
limit competition.
These various values usually take priority over competition policy.
For that reason there is no agreed upon consensual basis for drafting a
meaningful competition policy code. And if you recall history, the old
International Trade Organization, which was put forward in the 1990s,
died in part because there was no consensus in the United States and
elsewhere on competition policy. I suggest that, over the next decade,
the WTO will likewise find it difficult to reach agreement on competi-
tion policy.
Let me be a little more specific in terms of U.S. and European
Union positions in this area. Within the European Union a great deal is
going on in competition policy - but again let me emphasize, within
the European Union DG-IV has the power to regulate horizontal car-
tels to attack abuses of market power, and to go after anti-competitive
state subsidies. Sir Leon Brittan was very energetic in these areas. His
successor, Karel van Miert might not be quite so energetic. But all in
all, there has been a wave of pro-competitive activity over several years
emanating from DG-IV. And the European Union has certainly begun
to deregulate previously sheltered sectors - telecommunications, civil
aviation, and electric power.
Likewise, in the United States, we had the deregulation wave
started by President Carter and continued by President Reagan. More-
over, the United States has long embraced most other tenets of compe-
tition policy.
So one could say that the United States and Europe are at more or
less the same position in terms of internal constituencies for pro-com-
petitive policies. The same can be said of Canada and Australia, which
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have moved in the same direction on roughly the same time schedule.
These countries are ready to negotiate a competition code.
But if you were to ask is Asia ready; is Latin America ready?
Well, the answer today is "no." The deregulation mood which swept
North America and Europe in the last two decades just has not gone
forward to the same extent in those regions. Nor are the other tenets of
competition policy widely accepted.
And in some competition policy areas even the United States and
Europe have their sacred cows. I mentioned, for example, the anti-
dumping laws. Reform would be of very great interest in Asia and
many other countries. But reform seems to be almost impossible from a
political standpoint.
Let me give another example of an area where agreement is diffi-
cult. In Europe today there is great enthusiasm for using public money
to promote high-tech industry. There is waning enthusiasm for the sort
of "crisis cartels" exemplified by steel and shipbuilding in which Eu-
rope spent a lot of money and did not achieve very much. But enthusi-
asm is high for airbus and other high-tech ventures. European initia-
tives in these areas would likely take precedence over competition
policy.
So I conclude that we are not going to see much in terms of a
broad competition policy code negotiated internationally in the next
decade. Instead, we will make limited progress at the margin. There
may be lots of ideas, and these will be grist for institutes like ours
which publish books and articles. But real progress on a meaningful
code will be limited.
Having said that, I think there is good news in terms of more in-
tense international competition in selected industries. I want to illus-
trate just that with a recent history of two industries, civil aviation and
telecommunications.
If one looks at civil aviation in the Asia Pacific region today, there
is a spectrum from the wide-open competitive market exemplified by
the United States, to heavily monopolized markets, the extreme of
which would be Indonesia where a single airline, Garuda, controls the
skies. So we have a whole spectrum of civil aviation arrangements in
the Asia Pacific region. The good news is that the competitive edge of
this spectrum is making inroads on the monopolistic edge. The recent
United States/Canada agreement which amounts to an almost open
skies agreement, illustrates the wave of the future.
Historically, domestic carriers dealt with each other internation-
ally through so called Air Service Agreements or ASAs. ASAs con-
ferred a series of rights, the so-called five freedom rights, to carriers on
a reciprocal basis. The philosophy behind these ASAs was that my reg-
ulated carrier should get as much traffic in your market as your regu-
lated carrier gets in my market. And, by the way, let us both agree to
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keep fares high. While the ASA system is still formally in place, it has
been substantially eroded by creeping competition, without any big in-
ternational agreement.
We have had domestic deregulation, of course, in United States
and, to a large extent, in Canada and Australia. We have seen the
emergence of so-called consolidators which buy blocks of tickets and
then resell them to affinity groups, like the Case Western Law School,
to organize vacations in the Bahamas. Consolidators are now selling
tickets over-the-counter to individuals in Asia as well as in the United
States.
We have had code sharing which, for example, gives Lufthansa
the ability to sell seats all the way through from Frankfurt to Cleve-
land. In this example, United Airlines carries the passenger from New
York to Cleveland, and United and Lufthansa share the fare.
Another innovation is the technique of "yield management." Basi-
cally airlines sell seats on a varying scale of prices over the period from
when the flight is open - say six months in advance to half-an-hour
before it closes. Using sophisticated software, they try to sell virtually
all the available seats at widely differing prices. Price discrimination is
essential to the yield management story. It leads to much higher seat
loads and therefore lower average prices.
Many countries now realize that the tourist industry - meaning
lodging, food, and entertainment of various kinds - employs far more
people than the civil aviation industry. To promote employment, a
country does better with low fares than high fares. That basic idea has
dawned on Australians, and it is beginning to dawn in Indonesia.
Under pressure from all these forces, the ASA system is slowly
deteriorating. The best thing governments are doing is nothing. Gov-
ernments are not repairing all the loopholes that are being discovered
in the ASA system. The result is that the traveling public is rapidly
getting a competitive international civil aviation industry with lower
fares and more frequent scheduling.
Let me conclude with the telecommunications industry where
something of the same story is being told. Historically, telecommunica-
tions was a regulated market dominated by a monopoly carrier in each
country. The interface between carriers was handled by accounting rate
agreements which are a relic from the nineteenth century. The ac-
counting rate agreement specifies a per-minute charge that the
originating carrier pays to the destination carrier. The accounting rate
charge is quite different from the price which the originating carrier
charges its customers.
The assumption behind accounting rate agreements was that traf-
fic would be roughly balanced in both directions. The notion was that,
between any pair of markets, the charges would roughly balance out,
and the settlements at the end of the day between carriers would be
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rather small. The assumptions behind the accounting rate system have
been virtually demolished by new technology, with transmission by
fiberoptics, and satellites, and the extension of the kinds of information
which are transmitted from voice to data to video. The new means of
transmission and the new range of services have led to highly unbal-
anced two-way traffic flows with corresponding huge settlements under
the accounting rate system. The system is under intense pressure and
should soon be demolished.
Meanwhile, deregulation has swept a number of markets. The
United States is by no means in the forefront of deregulation. Hong
Kong is in the lead. There are something like twenty-one cellular tele-
phone operators in Hong Kong. The density of cellular telephones in
Hong Kong is higher than in any country in the world. You cannot go
out on the street without seeing lots of people talking on their cellulars.
By contrast, we still have the regional Bells, with their local monopoly
powers.
The deregulation mood has swept the Pacific area, with Hong
Kong at one extreme, and say Australia, the United States, and Ca-
nada someplace in between. And at the other extreme, Japan and Ko-
rea are still largely innocent of deregulation.
Deregulation usually starts with the international services and
other high-end services such as data transmission. In the equipment
market, it reaches terminal equipment first and then central switching
equipment. Today, the frontier of deregulation is local service and in-
ternal long distance.
As in civil aviation, but to a greater extent, we are seeing the
emergence of corporate telecom alliances. Three major alliances have
already been organized around big carriers. The goal is to establish the
capability of giving any user point-to-point service any place in the
world for any mode - data, video, and voice. All this is happening
without government action, except initial decisions to deregulate inter-
nal markets. Once that happened, much of the rest has resulted from
corporate initiatives, without too much negotiation at the international
level.
So I would conclude that, in telecommunications, we have a model
for promoting far better service and cheaper rates without a lot of gov-
ernment intervention. That is an optimistic note on which to conclude.
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